A model of liquidity hoarding and term premia in inter-bank markets

被引:125
作者
Acharya, Viral V. [2 ,3 ]
Skeie, David [1 ]
机构
[1] Fed Reserve Bank New York, New York, NY 10045 USA
[2] NYU Stern, New York, NY USA
[3] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
DEBT; RISK;
D O I
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2011.05.006
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Financial crises are associated with reduced volumes and extreme levels of rates for term inter-bank loans, reflected in one-month and three-month LIBOR. We explain such stress by modeling leveraged banks' precautionary demand for liquidity. Asset shocks impair a bank's ability to roll over debt because of agency problems associated with high leverage. In turn, banks hoard liquidity and decrease term lending as their rollover risk increases over the term of the loan. High levels of short-term leverage and illiquidity of assets lead to low volumes and high rates for term borrowing. In extremis, inter-bank markets can completely freeze. (C) 2011 Published by Elsevier B.V.
引用
收藏
页码:436 / 447
页数:12
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