Large debt financing: syndicated loans versus corporate bonds

被引:36
作者
Altunbas, Yener [2 ]
Kara, Alper [1 ]
Marques-Ibanez, David [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Loughborough, Sch Business, Loughborough, Leics, England
[2] Bangor Univ, Sch Business, Bangor, Gwynedd, Wales
[3] European Cent Bank, Financial Res Div, Frankfurt, Germany
关键词
syndicated loans; corporate bonds; debt choice; the euro area; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; INFORMATION ASYMMETRY; MARKET EQUILIBRIUM; PUBLIC DEBT; BANK DEBT; INTERMEDIATION; INVESTMENT; PRIVATE; CHOICE; EQUITY;
D O I
10.1080/13518470903314394
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Following the introduction of the euro, the markets for large debt financing experienced a historical expansion. We investigate the financial factors behind the issuance of syndicated loans for an extensive sample of euro area non-financial corporations. For the first time, we compare these factors to those of its major competitor: the corporate bond market. We find that large firms, with greater financial leverage, more (verifiable) profits and higher liquidation values tend to choose syndicated loans. In contrast, firms with more short-term debt and those perceived by markets as having more growth opportunities favour financing through corporate bonds. Syndicated loans are the preferred instrument at the extreme where firms are very large, profitable but have less growth opportunities.
引用
收藏
页码:437 / 458
页数:22
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