The difference that CEOs make:: An assignment model approach

被引：224

作者：

Tervio, Marko ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Calif Berkeley, Haas Sch Business, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2008年 / 98卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/aer.98.3.642

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper presents an assignment model of CEOs and firms. The distributions of CEO pay levels and firms' market values are analyzed as the competitive equilibrium of a matching market where talents, as well as CEO positions, are scarce. It is shown how the observed joint distribution of CEO pay and market value can then be used to infer the economic value of underlying ability differences. The variation in CEO pay is found to be mostly due to variation in firm characteristics, whereas implied differences in managerial ability are small and make relatively little difference to shareholder value.

引用

页码：642 / 668

页数：27

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