Public policy for venture capital

被引:72
作者
Keuschnigg, C
Nielsen, SB
机构
[1] Univ St Gallen IFF, CESifo, CH-9000 St Gallen, Switzerland
[2] CEPR, CH-9000 St Gallen, Switzerland
[3] Copenhagen Business Sch, EPRU, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
[4] CEPR, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
关键词
venture capital; moral hazard; managerial advice; public policy;
D O I
10.1023/A:1011251920041
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper proposes a simple partial equilibrium model to investigate the effects of government policy on venture capital backed investments. Giving up an alternative career, entrepreneurs focus their effort on a single, high risk venture each. Venture capitalists acquire an equity stake and offer a base salary as well. In addition to providing incentive compatible equity finance, they support the venture with managerial advice to raise survival chances. We analyze several policy measures addressed at venture capital activity: government spending on entrepreneurial training, subsidies to equipment investment, and output subsidies at the production stage. While these measures stimulate entrepreneurship, only cost-effective government services can improve welfare.
引用
收藏
页码:557 / 572
页数:16
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