Organizational design: Decision rights and incentive contracts

被引：67

作者：

Athey, S

Roberts, J

机构：

[1] MIT, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA

[2] Hoover Inst, Stanford, CA USA

[3] Stanford Univ, Grad Sch Business, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/aer.91.2.200

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：200 / 205

页数：6

共 13 条

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