Affordances are enough: Reply to Chemero et al. (2003)

Chemero, Klein, and Cordeiro (this issue) present an argument about the utility of a concept of events within the ecological approach to perception and action. They define ecological events as changes in the layout of affordances, and they distinguish this concept from earlier definitions of event, which they refer to as physical events. They argue that changes in the layout of affordances should be perceived, that is, that their perception is motivated by the ecological approach to perception and action. They also argue that changes in the layout of affordances are perceived, and they offer an experiment that supports the hypothesis that humans are sensitive to changes in the layout of affordances. What they do not do, I argue, is offer any compelling reason why event should be applied to changes in the layout of affordances. I also argue that changes in the layout of affordances do not have a special ontological status that might merit a unique name or constitute a category of perceivables that is logically distinct from affordances.