The Doomsday argument Adam & Eve, UN++, and Quantum Joe

被引:15
作者
Bostrom, N [1 ]
机构
[1] Yale Univ, Dept Philosophy, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1023/A:1010350925053
中图分类号
N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;
摘要
The Doomsday argument purports to show that the risk of the human species going extinct soon has been systematically underestimated. This argument has something in common with controversial forms of reasoning in other areas, including: game theoretic problems with imperfect recall, the methodology of cosmology, the epistemology of indexical belief, and the debate over so-called fine-tuning arguments for the design hypothesis. The common denominator is a certain premiss: the Self-Sampling Assumption. We present two strands of argument in favor of this assumption. Through a series of thought experiments we then investigate some bizarre prima facie consequences - backward causation, psychic powers, and an apparent conflict with the Principal Principle.
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收藏
页码:359 / 387
页数:29
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