Is Social Security Really Bad for Growth?

被引：31

作者：

Bellettini, Giorgio ^{[1
]}

Ceroni, Carlotta Berti ^{[1
,2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Bologna, I-40126 Bologna, Italy

[2] Univ Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS | 1999年 / 2卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/redy.1998.0050

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper develops a model of endogenous growth with overlapping generations to investigate the joint determination of social security, public investment, and growth in a small open economy. We show that a pure pay-as-you-go system with benefits indexed to wages provides taxpayers with incentives to support growth oriented policies, which increase the future productivity of labor. We find that outcomes characterized by positive levels of intergenerational redistribution, public investment, and long-run growth can be sustained as subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of an infinitely repeated intergenerational game, if and only if the marginal productivity of public capital is large enough. Furthermore, we show that transfers comove with public investment and growth. (C) 1999 Academic Press

引用

页码：796 / 819

页数：24

共 38 条

[1] DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS AND ECONOMIC-GROWTH [J].