Empirical strategies in contract economics: Information and the boundary of the firm

被引:11
作者
Baker, GP [1 ]
Hubbard, TN
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Sch Business, Boston, MA 02163 USA
[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Univ Chicago, Grad Sch Business, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/aer.91.2.189
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
[No abstract available]
引用
收藏
页码:189 / 194
页数:6
相关论文
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