Environmental resources, property regimes, and efficiency

Why are certain property regimes preferred? They cannot be chosen on the basis of efficiency considerations alone, as what is efficient depends on the institutional structures themselves and the interests they defend. The author highlights some important distinctions between various property regimes: whereas categories like private, common, and state property all may imply some degree of co-ownership and overlap along some dimensions, the logic of each system, ideally defined, may be quite distinct. The author shows that there is nothing inherent in a resource that demands a certain regime. Property regimes are social constructs and must be defended by judgment, not by necessity. The author demonstrates that the main role of property regimes is to defend certain interests. Furthermore, they seem to influence which interests are formed or become activated. The preferences which form the basis for efficiency evaluations are thus dependent upon the chosen system. In this way, technically oriented evaluations like cost-benefit analysis are caught in severe circularities. The implication of this for policy is that the evaluation of regimes implies taking a stand concerning what we want to become, both as individuals and as a society.