A model to analyse financial fragility

被引:93
作者
Goodhart, CAE
Sunirand, P
Tsomocos, DP
机构
[1] Bank England, London EC2R 8AH, England
[2] London Sch Econ, London WC2A 2AE, England
[3] Financial Markets Grp, London WC2A 2AE, England
[4] Univ Oxford, Said Business Sch, Oxford OX1 1HP, England
基金
英国经济与社会研究理事会;
关键词
financial fragility; commerical banks; general equilibrium; default; incomplete markets; monetary policy; regulatory policy;
D O I
10.1007/s00199-004-0572-7
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper sets out a tractable model which illuminates problems relating to individual bank behaviour, to possible contagious inter-relationships between banks, and to the appropriate design of prudential requirements and incentives to limit 'excessive' risk-taking. Our model is rich enough to include heterogeneous agents, endogenous default, and multiple commodity, and credit and deposit markets. Yet, it is simple enough to be effectively computable and can therefore be used as a practical framework to analyse financial fragility. Financial fragility in our model emerges naturally as an equilibrium phenomenon. Among other results, a non-trivial quantity theory of money is derived, liquidity and default premia co-determine interest rates, and both regulatory and monetary policies have non-neutral effects. The model also indicates how monetary policy may affect financial fragility, thus highlighting the trade-off between financial stability and economic efficiency.
引用
收藏
页码:107 / 142
页数:36
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