On social norms: the evolution of considerate smoking behavior

被引:79
作者
Nyborg, K
Rege, M
机构
[1] Ragner Frisch Ctr Econ Res, N-0349 Oslo, Norway
[2] Case Western Reserve Univ, Weatherhead Sch Management, Dept Econ, Cleveland, OH 44106 USA
关键词
passive smoking; regulation; social norms; evolutionary game theory;
D O I
10.1016/S0167-2681(03)00031-3
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper studies the formation of social norms for considerate smoking behavior. Being considerate yields higher social approval from non-smokers, but also imposes an inconvenience cost. Non-smokers' disapproval of inconsiderate smoking is assumed to be stronger the less used they are to passive smoking. Introduction of a smoking regulation may then move society from an initial no-consideration equilibrium to an equilibrium in which a large share of smokers are considerate, even in the unregulated zone. Empirical evidence confirms that social norms have changed in Norway after the smoking law amendments in 1988, and supports the plausibility of model assumptions. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:323 / 340
页数:18
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