Manager Characteristics and Capital Structure: Theory and Evidence

被引:27
作者
Bhagat, Sanjai [1 ]
Bolton, Brian [2 ]
Subramanian, Ajay [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Colorado, Leeds Sch Business, Boulder, CO 80309 USA
[2] Portland State Univ, Sch Business Adm, Portland, OR 97207 USA
[3] Georgia State Univ, Robinson Coll Business, Atlanta, GA 30303 USA
关键词
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES; SPECIFICATION; TESTS; BANKRUPTCY; DECISIONS; MODEL;
D O I
10.1017/S0022109011000482
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We investigate the effects of manager characteristics on capital structure in a structural model. We implement the manager's optimal contracts through financial securities that lead to a dynamic capital structure, which reflects the effects of taxes, bankruptcy costs, and manager-shareholder agency conflicts. Long-term debt declines with the manager's ability, inside equity stake, and the firm's long-term risk, but increases with its short-term risk. Short-term debt declines with the manager's ability, increases with her equity ownership, and declines with short-term risk. We show support for these implications in our empirical analysis.
引用
收藏
页码:1581 / 1627
页数:47
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