Cost sharing: the nondifferentiable case

被引：9

作者：

Haimanko, O ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Catholique Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain, Belgium

来源：

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS | 2001年 / 35卷 / 03期

关键词：

axiomatic cost sharing; nondifferentiable cost functions; Aumann-Shapley price mechanism; Mertens mechanism;

D O I：

10.1016/S0304-4068(01)00052-0

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We show existence and uniqueness of a cost allocation mechanism, satisfying standard axioms, on two classes of cost functions with major nondifferentiabilities. The first class consists of convex functions which exhibit nondecreasing marginal casts to scale, and the second of piecewise linear functions. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：445 / 462

页数：18

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