Sustaining collusion via a fuzzy trigger

被引:6
作者
Goodhue, RE [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Davis, Dept Agr & Resource Econ, Davis, CA 95616 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
fuzzy logic and economics; uncertainty and information; trigger prices; collusion;
D O I
10.1023/A:1007796509603
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Probability theory is the standard economic representation of uncertainty. although it is not always an accurate one. Fuzzy logic is an alternative representation that does not require individual beliefs regarding the explicit functional form of uncertainty. This paper applies :Fuzzy logic to an oligopoly trigger pricing game. The fuzzy trigger pricing game reverses the standard cyclical price war prediction; collusion-sustaining price wars are most likely to occur during times of high demand. The fuzzy model also predicts that markets with relatively volatile prices are more likely to undergo collusion-sustaining price wars. The predictions are consistent with available empirical evidence.
引用
收藏
页码:333 / 345
页数:13
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