Moderation in the pursuit of justice: Explaining Japan's failure in the international whaling negotiations

被引:9
作者
Friedheim, RL
机构
[1] School of International Relations, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, 90089-0043
关键词
cultural molding; domestic constraints; International Whaling Commission (IWC); Japan; Japanese bargaining behavior; moratorium; rational choice; Southern Ocean sanctuary; whales; whaling;
D O I
10.1080/00908329609546089
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
Since 1982, the bargaining tactics and strategy pursued by Japan in the yearly meetings of the international Whaling Commission (IWC), in its attempt to lift a whaling moratorium and prevent the creation of a Southern Ocean sanctuary have been notably unsuccessful. But Japan has persisted and continued using the same approach. The purpose of this article is to analyze and explain Japan's bargaining behavior in the IWC. After explicating the modern history of negotiations within the IWC, the author notes several attributes of Japan's bargaining behavior: moderation or reasonableness, persistence as a strategy, passivity and legalism. Three possible explanatory variables are advanced: rational choice, cultural molding or a ''Japanese way,'' and domestic constraints on the negotiators. After testing these variables, it is concluded that all three are needed to understand Japanese bargaining behavior.
引用
收藏
页码:349 / 378
页数:30
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