Federal intervention to enhance shareholder choice

被引:14
作者
Bebchuk, LA [1 ]
Ferrell, A
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Sch Law, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
D O I
10.2307/1073860
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
[No abstract available]
引用
收藏
页码:993 / 1006
页数:14
相关论文
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