Non-inferior Nash strategies for routing control in parallel-link communication networks

被引:5
作者
Liu, Y
Simaan, MA [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Pittsburgh, Dept Elect Engn, Pittsburgh, PA 15261 USA
[2] Ohio State Univ, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Columbus, OH 43210 USA
关键词
communication networks; parallel link networks; routing control; game theory; Nash strategies; non-inferior strategies;
D O I
10.1002/dac.708
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
We consider a routing control problem of two-node parallel-link communication network shared by competitive teams of users. Each team has various types of entities (traffics or jobs) to be routed on the network. The users in each team cooperate for the benefit of their team so as to achieve optimal routing over network links. The teams, on the other hand, compete among themselves for the network resources and each has an objective function that relates to the overall performance of the network. For each team, there is a centralized decision-maker, called the team leader or manager, who coordinates the routing strategies among all entities in his team. A game theoretic approach to deal with both cooperation within each team and competition among the teams, called the Non-inferior Nash strategy, is introduced. Considering the roles of a group manager in this context, the concept of a Non-inferior Nash strategy with a team leader is introduced. This multi-team solution provides a new framework for analysing hierarchically controlled systems so as to address complicated coordination problems among the various users. This strategy is applied to derive the optimal routing policies for all users in the network. It is shown that Non-inferior Nash strategies with a team leader is effective in improving the overall network performance. Various types of other strategies such as team optimization and Nash strategies are also discussed for the purpose of comparison. Copyright (c) 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
引用
收藏
页码:347 / 361
页数:15
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