Compliance in the Fishery Protection Zone around Svalbard

被引:20
作者
Honneland, G [1 ]
机构
[1] Fridtjof Nansen Inst, N-1324 Lysaker, Norway
关键词
compliance; fishery control; enforcement; legitimacy; Svalbard; the Barents Sea;
D O I
10.1080/00908329809546131
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
The 200-mile Fishery Protection Zone around Svalbard was established by the Norwegian government in 1977 and has been an issue of international dispute ever since. The disagreement is rooted in different interpretations of the 1920 Svalbard Treaty and has led Norway to choose a gentle enforcement of fishery regulations in the area. In practice, this has implied that violators in the Svalbard Zone are not punished. Violation statistics from the Norwegian Coast Guard nevertheless reveal a high degree of compliance by fishermen. The main question of the present article is how this compliance can be explained. It is apparently problematic to account for it through a traditional coercion-based approach since the threat of sanctions is absent. It is suggested that actual compliance is the result of such various factors as legitimacy, discursive measures, "indirect coercion" or "creeping compliance," diplomatic negotiations, and sometimes also a lack of incentive on the part of fishermen to violate the rules.
引用
收藏
页码:339 / 360
页数:22
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