Innovation and investment under financial constraints and product market competition

被引：14

作者：

Maurer, B ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Mckinsey & Co Inc, D-10707 Berlin, Germany

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 1999年 / 17卷 / 04期

关键词：

innovation; optimal financial contracts; predation; strategic complementarities;

D O I：

10.1016/S0167-7187(97)00047-7

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The present paper extends previous work on predatory behavior against financially constrained firms (e.g. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990)) to include innovation and product market competition. I show that the pattern of strategic interaction between competing firms determines behavioral changes coming from financial constraints. Both leveraged and unleveraged firms react to financial constraints. The theory is used to explain recent empirical findings concerning the interaction of capital market imperfections and market structure. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：455 / 476

页数：22

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