Regulation of state-owned and privatized utilities: Ukraine electricity distribution company performance

被引：38

作者：

Berg, S ^{[1
]}

Lin, C ^{[1
]}

Tsaplin, V ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Florida, PURC, Gainesville, FL 32611 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF REGULATORY ECONOMICS | 2005年 / 28卷 / 03期

关键词：

data envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA); incentive regulation; state-owned and privatized utilities;

D O I：

10.1007/s11149-005-3957-z

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Both ownership and regulation affect the behavior of utility managers. Private ownership rewards managerial decisions that enhance shareholder value. Regulatory incentives reward behavior that affects profits and costs. An empirical analysis of 24 Ukraine electricity distribution companies from 1998 to 2002 indicates that privately owned firms do respond to incentives that add to net cash flows (associated with reducing commercial and non-commercial network losses). However, they also respond more aggressively than do state-owned distribution utilities to mark-up (cost-plus) regulatory incentives that increase shareholder value but decrease cost efficiency.

引用

页码：259 / 287

页数：29

共 31 条

[1]

[Anonymous], STOCHASTIC FRONTIER

[2] Generating efficiency: economic and environmental regulation of public and private electricity generators in Spain [J].