Distributed game-based pricing strategy for energy sharing in microgrid with PV prosumers

被引:64
作者
Cui, Shichang [1 ]
Wang, Yan-Wu [1 ,2 ]
Liu, Nian [3 ]
机构
[1] Huazhong Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Automat, Wuhan 430074, Hubei, Peoples R China
[2] China Three Gorges Univ, Hubei Prov Collaborat Innovat Ctr New Energy Micr, Yichang 443000, Peoples R China
[3] North China Elect Power Univ, State Key Lab Alternate Elect Power Syst Renewabl, Beijing 102206, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
distributed power generation; game theory; pricing; photovoltaic power systems; power markets; distributed game-based pricing strategy; PV prosumers; energy consumers; photovoltaic installations; PV installations; energy sharing problem; Stackelberg game; microgrid operator; MGO; internal buying prices; selling prices; energy trading; day-ahead market; real-time market; Stackelberg equilibrium; heuristic algorithm; VIRTUAL POWER-PLANT; DEMAND RESPONSE; ELECTRICITY; OPTIMIZATION; MANAGEMENT; GENERATION; OPERATION; NETWORKS; MARKETS; STORAGE;
D O I
10.1049/iet-rpg.2017.0570
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
083001 [环境科学];
摘要
In recent years, many traditional energy consumers are transforming to prosumers with photovoltaic (PV) installations. Thus, energy sharing among prosumers has become a research focus. In this study, the energy sharing problem in a microgrid is formulated as a Stackelberg game. The microgrid operator (MGO) is the leader of the game setting internal buying and selling prices for energy sharing and balances the power mismatch of microgrid by trading energy in day-ahead and real-time market. PV prosumers are the followers of the game deciding their energy sharing profiles in response to internal prices. Each participant of the game makes its best decision to maximise its utility or profit. The Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) is a set of decisions of internal prices and energy sharing profiles, and in SE each participant cannot increase its utility or profit by changing its decision. The existence and uniqueness of the SE have been strictly proved by showing the utility function of MGO is unimodal and has a unique optimal solution. The heuristic algorithm is presented for MGO to achieve the SE in a distributed way, where prosumers get to protect their privacies. Simulation cases have verified the effectiveness and feasibility of the energy sharing strategy.
引用
收藏
页码:380 / 388
页数:9
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