Markets and regulatory hold-up problems

被引:44
作者
Gersbach, H
Glazer, A
机构
[1] Univ Heidelberg, Alfred Weber Inst, D-69117 Heidelberg, Germany
[2] Univ Calif Irvine, Dept Econ, Irvine, CA 92717 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1006/jeem.1998.1063
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Many regulatory programs such as environmental regulation are effective only if firms make irreversible investments that reduce the cost of compliance. A firm potentially subject to regulation may therefore behave strategically by not investing, thereby forcing the regulator to void the proposed regulation. We show that such incentives, which resemble a hold-up problem, may not be overcome when government's only tool is the imposition of an emissions tax. The hold-up problem can be overcome by the issuance of tradeable permits. A time-consistent equilibrium exists with all firms investing and the government imposing regulations, even if no permits are traded and their market price is low. Indeed, an observation of no trade may indicate that pollution abatement is great. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
引用
收藏
页码:151 / 164
页数:14
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