Rent Preservation and the Persistence of Underdevelopment

被引:41
作者
Rajan, Raghuram G. [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Chicago, Grad Sch Business, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
ECONOMIC-DEVELOPMENT; INSTITUTIONS; INEQUALITY; POLITICS;
D O I
10.1257/mac.1.1.178
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
When citizens in a poor constrained society are unequally endowed, they are likely to find it hard to agree on reforms, even though the status quo hurts them collectively. Each citizen group or constituency prefers reforms that expand its opportunities, but in an unequal society, this will typically hurt another constituency's rents. Competitive rent preservation ensures no comprehensive reform path may command broad support. The roots of underdevelopment may therefore lie in the natural tendency toward rent preservation in a divided society. (JEL D72, O10, O17)
引用
收藏
页码:178 / 218
页数:41
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