Policymaking, comitology, and the balance of power in the European Union

被引：24

作者：

Steunenberg, B ^{[1
]}

Koboldt, C ^{[1
]}

Schmidtchen, D ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV SAARLAND,D-6600 SAARBRUCKEN,GERMANY

来源：

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS | 1996年 / 16卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0144-8188(96)00026-9

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Using simple game theory, this paper analyzes the working properties of the different procedures laid down in the comitology decision, i.e., the European Council's decision on procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission. Furthermore, it addresses the question of how the balance of power is determined by this decision.

引用

页码：329 / 344

页数：16

共 8 条

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[3]

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[4]

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[5]

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[6]

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[8]

[No title captured]

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