Collateralized debt as the optimal contract

被引：21

作者：

Lacker, JM ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Fed Res Bank Richmond, Richmond, VA 23261 USA

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS | 2001年 / 4卷 / 04期

关键词：

debt; financial contracts; optimal contracts; collateral; asymmetric information; borrowing constraints;

D O I：

10.1006/redy.2001.0138

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In a multiple-good risk-sharing environment with ex post private information, conditions are found under which collateralized debt is the optimal contract. The necessary and sufficient condition is that the borrower values the collateral good more highly than does the lender; otherwise the optimal contract does not resemble debt. Limited collateral can give rise to an endogenous borrowing constraint, driving a further wedge between the intertemporal marginal rates of substitution of the borrower and the lender. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, G10. (C) 2001 Academic Press.

引用

页码：842 / 859

页数：18