Government spending cycles: Ideological or opportunistic?

被引:25
作者
vanDalen, HP [1 ]
Swank, OH [1 ]
机构
[1] TINBERGEN ROTTERDAM AMSTERDAM CTR ECON,ROTTERDAM,NETHERLANDS
关键词
D O I
10.1007/BF00114285
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper examines whether partisan and opportunistic motives affect government expenditure growth in the Netherlands. The time series analysis, covering the period 1953-1993, allows for different types of government spending. In general, spending is inspired by ideological and opportunistic motives: all government expenditure categories show an upward drift during election times and the 'partisan' motives behind government spending are clearly revealed: left-wing cabinets attach greater importance to social security and health care than right-wing cabinets and right-wing cabinets value expenditure on infrastructure and defense more than left-wing parties.
引用
收藏
页码:183 / 200
页数:18
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