Organizational learning takes place through activities performed by individuals, groups, and organizations as they gather and digest information, imagine and plan new actions, and implement change. I examine the learning practices of companies in two industries - nuclear power plants and chemical process plants - that must manage safety as a major component of operations, and therefore must learn from precursors and near-misses rather than exclusively by trial-and-error. Specifically, I analyse the linked assumptions or logics underlying incident reviews, root cause analysis teams, and self-analysis programmes. These loses arise from occupational and hierarchical groups that work on different problems in different ways - for example, anticipation and resilience, fixing and learning, concrete and abstract. In organizations with fragmentary, myopic and disparate understandings of how the work is accomplished, there ape likely to be more failures to learn from operating experience, recurrent problems, and cyclical crises. Enhanced learning requires ways to broaden and bring together disparate logics.
