Visions of rationality

被引:89
作者
Chase, VM [1 ]
Hertwig, R [1 ]
Gigerenzer, G [1 ]
机构
[1] Max Planck Inst Human Dev, Ctr Adapt Behav & Cognit, D-14195 Berlin, Germany
关键词
D O I
10.1016/S1364-6613(98)01179-6
中图分类号
B84 [心理学]; C [社会科学总论]; Q98 [人类学];
学科分类号
03 ; 0303 ; 030303 ; 04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
The classical view that equates rationality With adherence to the laws of probability theory and logic has driven much research on inference. Recently, an increasing number of researchers have begun to espouse a view of rationality that takes account of organisms' adaptive goals, natural environments, and cognitive constraints. We argue that inference is carried out using boundedly rational heuristics, that is, heuristics that allow organisms to reach their goals under conditions of limited time, information, and computational capacity. These heuristics are ecologically rational: in that they exploit aspects of both the physical and social environment in order to make adaptive inferences. Vile review recent work exploring this multifaceted conception of rationality.
引用
收藏
页码:206 / 214
页数:9
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