Quality signals? The role of patents, alliances, and team experience in venture capital financing

被引:191
作者
Hoenig, Daniel [1 ]
Henkel, Joachim [1 ]
机构
[1] Tech Univ Munich, TUM Sch Management, D-80333 Munich, Germany
关键词
Patents; Alliances; Teams; Venture capital; Signaling; Technology; START-UP TEAMS; BIOTECHNOLOGY FIRMS; DECISION-PROCESS; MIXED LOGIT; TRADE-OFFS; PERFORMANCE; INNOVATION; MODELS; INDUSTRY; CHOICE;
D O I
10.1016/j.respol.2014.11.011
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Observable resources, particularly patents, alliances, and team experience, are known to affect a startup's ability to attract venture capital financing. In this context they potentially fulfill a twofold function: as productive assets and, likely, as signals of characteristics of a venture that are not observable at the time of assessment. In particular, patents, alliances, and team experience may serve as signals of the unobservable quality of a venture's technology. Most existing studies based on firm-level transaction data cannot disentangle signaling from productive effects. Using a conjoint-based survey among 187 European and U.S. venture capitalists, we find they rely on research alliances and, partly, on team experience as signals of technological quality. While patents affect the venture capitalists' decision making in their property rights function, we find no indication that they serve as technology quality signals. C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1049 / 1064
页数:16
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