The role of multilateral institutions in international trade cooperation

被引:130
作者
Maggi, G [1 ]
机构
[1] Princeton Univ, Dept Econ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
[2] NYU, Dept Econ, New York, NY 10012 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/aer.89.1.190
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The World Trade Organization (WTO) lacks the power to directly enforce agreements. It is therefore important to understand what role the WTO can play to facilitate international cooperation, and whether a multilateral institution can offer distinct advantages over a web of bilateral agreements. This paper examines two potential benefits of a multilateral trade institution:first, verifying violations of the agreements and informing third parties, thus facilitating multilateral reputation mechanisms; second promoting multilateral trade negotiations rather than a web of bilateral negotiations. The model suggests that a multilateral approach is particularly important when there are strong imbalances in bilateral trading relationships. (JEL F13).
引用
收藏
页码:190 / 214
页数:25
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