Dunning-Kruger effects in reasoning: Theoretical implications of the failure to recognize incompetence

被引:133
作者
Pennycook, Gordon [1 ]
Ross, Robert M. [2 ,3 ]
Koehler, Derek J. [4 ]
Fugelsang, Jonathan A. [4 ]
机构
[1] Yale Univ, Dept Psychol, 2 Hillhouse Ave, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
[2] Royal Holloway Univ London, Dept Psychol, London, England
[3] Macquarie Univ, ARC Ctr Excellence Cognit & Its Disorders, Sydney, NSW, Australia
[4] Univ Waterloo, Dept Psychol, Waterloo, ON, Canada
基金
加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会;
关键词
Decision making; High-order cognition; Judgment; COGNITIVE REFLECTION TEST; DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES; SELF-VIEWS INFLUENCE; INDIVIDUAL-DIFFERENCES; ANALYTIC THINKING; DECISION-MAKING; SUBSTITUTION SENSITIVITY; LOGICAL INTUITIONS; CONFLICT DETECTION; OWN INCOMPETENCE;
D O I
10.3758/s13423-017-1242-7
中图分类号
B841 [心理学研究方法];
学科分类号
040201 ;
摘要
The Dunning-Kruger effect refers to the observation that the incompetent are often ill-suited to recognize their incompetence. Here we investigated potential Dunning-Kruger effects in high-level reasoning and, in particular, focused on the relative effectiveness of metacognitive monitoring among particularly biased reasoners. Participants who made the greatest numbers of errors on the cognitive reflection test (CRT) overestimated their performance on this test by a factor of more than 3. Overestimation decreased as CRT performance increased, and those who scored particularly high underestimated their performance. Evidence for this type of systematic miscalibration was also found on a self-report measure of analytic-thinking disposition. Namely, genuinely nonanalytic participants (on the basis of CRT performance) overreported their "need for cognition" (NC), indicating that they were dispositionally analytic when their objective performance indicated otherwise. Furthermore, estimated CRT performance was just as strong a predictor of NC as was actual CRT performance. Our results provide evidence for Dunning-Kruger effects both in estimated performance on the CRT and in self-reported analytic-thinking disposition. These findings indicate that part of the reason why people are biased is that they are either unaware of or indifferent to their own bias.
引用
收藏
页码:1774 / 1784
页数:11
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