Incommensurable alternatives and rational choice

被引：7

作者：

Andreou, C ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Utah, Dept Philosophy, Salt Lake City, UT 84112 USA

来源：

RATIO | 2005年 / 18卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1467-9329.2005.00288.x

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

I consider the implications of incommensurability for the assumption, in rational choice theory, that a rational agent's preferences are complete. I argue that, contrary to appearances, the completeness assumption and the existence of incommensurability are compatible. Indeed, reflection on incommensurability suggests that one's preferences should be complete over even the incommensurable alternatives one faces.

引用

页码：249 / 261

页数：13