Heterogeneity and the dynamics of technology adoption

被引:36
作者
Ryan, Stephen P. [1 ,2 ]
Tucker, Catherine [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] MIT, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] MIT, Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
来源
QME-QUANTITATIVE MARKETING AND ECONOMICS | 2012年 / 10卷 / 01期
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Technology adoption; Videoconferencing; Dynamics; Network effects; Unobserved heterogeneity; NETWORK EXTERNALITIES; COMPETITION; ECONOMICS; MARKET; ORGANIZATION; HIERARCHIES; MODEL; FIRM;
D O I
10.1007/s11129-011-9109-0
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We estimate the demand for a videocalling technology in the presence of both network effects and heterogeneity. Using a unique dataset from a large multinational firm, we pose and estimate a fully dynamic model of technology adoption. We propose a novel identification strategy based on post-adoption technology usage to disentangle equilibrium beliefs concerning the evolution of the network from observed and unobserved heterogeneity in technology adoption costs and use benefits. We find that employees have significant heterogeneity in both adoption costs and network benefits, and have preferences for diverse networks. Using our estimates, we evaluate a number of counterfactual adoption policies, and find that a policy of strategically targeting the right subtype for initial adoption can lead to a faster-growing and larger network than a policy of uncoordinated or diffuse adoption.
引用
收藏
页码:63 / 109
页数:47
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