Reputation and influence in charitable giving: an experiment

被引:44
作者
Reinstein, David [1 ]
Riener, Gerhard [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Essex, Dept Econ, Colchester CO4 3SQ, Essex, England
[2] Univ Jena GK EIC, D-07743 Jena, Germany
[3] MPI Econ, D-07743 Jena, Germany
关键词
Charitable giving; Experimental design; Reputation; Influence; Peer effects; Altruism; PUBLIC-GOODS; VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS; ALTRUISM; RECIPROCITY; DICTATOR; ECONOMICS; ANONYMITY; DONATIONS; PHILANTHROPY; COOPERATION;
D O I
10.1007/s11238-011-9245-8
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Previous experimental and observational work suggests that people act more generously when they are observed and observe others in social settings. However, the explanation for this is unclear. An individual may want to send a signal of her generosity to improve her own reputation. Alternately ( or additionally) she may value the public good or charity itself and, believing that contribution levels are strategic complements, give more to influence others to give more. We perform the first series of laboratory experiments that can separately estimate the impact of these two social effects, and test whether realized influence is consistent with the desire to influence, and whether either of these are consistent with anticipated influence. Our experimental subjects were given the opportunity to contribute from their endowment to Bread for the World, a development NGO. Depending on treatment, "leader" subjects' donations were reported to other subjects either anonymously or with their identities, and these were reported either before these "follower" subjects made their donation decisions. We find that "leaders" are influential only when their identities are revealed along with their donations, and female leaders are more influential than males. Identified leaders' predictions suggest that are aware of their influence. They respond to this by giving more than either the control group or the unidentified leaders. We find mixed evidence for "reputation-seeking."
引用
收藏
页码:221 / 243
页数:23
相关论文
共 49 条
[1]   Anonymity, reciprocity, and conformity: Evidence from voluntary contributions to a national park in Costa Rica [J].
Alpizar, Francisco ;
Carlsson, Fredrik ;
Johansson-Stenman, Olof .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 2008, 92 (5-6) :1047-1060
[2]   Public goods experiments without confidentiality: a glimpse into fund-raising [J].
Andreoni, J ;
Petrie, R .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 2004, 88 (7-8) :1605-1623
[3]   IMPURE ALTRUISM AND DONATIONS TO PUBLIC-GOODS - A THEORY OF WARM-GLOW GIVING [J].
ANDREONI, J .
ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 1990, 100 (401) :464-477
[4]  
Andreoni J., 2006, J Public Econ Theory, V8, P1, DOI [10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00250.x, DOI 10.1111/J.1467-9779.2006.00250.X]
[5]  
[Anonymous], SOCIAL INFLUEN UNPUB
[6]   Giving overseas and public policy [J].
Atkinson, A. B. .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 2009, 93 (5-6) :647-653
[7]   Dictator game giving: altruism or artefact? [J].
Bardsley, Nicholas .
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, 2008, 11 (02) :122-133
[8]  
Bekkers R, 2008, GENEROSITY PHILANTHR
[9]   ON THE PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC-GOODS [J].
BERGSTROM, T ;
BLUME, L ;
VARIAN, H .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1986, 29 (01) :25-49
[10]   A THEORY OF CONFORMITY [J].
BERNHEIM, BD .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1994, 102 (05) :841-877