Does stake size matter for cooperation and punishment?

被引:60
作者
Kocher, Martin G. [1 ,2 ]
Martinsson, Peter [3 ]
Visser, Martine [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Innsbruck, Dept Econ, A-6020 Innsbruck, Austria
[2] Univ Amsterdam, CREED, NL-1012 WX Amsterdam, Netherlands
[3] Univ Gothenburg, Dept Econ, Gothenburg, Sweden
[4] Univ Cape Town, Sch Econ, ZA-7700 Rondebosch, South Africa
关键词
experiment; public goods; punishment; stake size;
D O I
10.1016/j.econlet.2007.09.048
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The effects of stake size on cooperation and punishment are investigated using a public goods experiment. We find that an increase in stake size does neither significantly affect cooperation nor the level of punishment. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:508 / 511
页数:4
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