Do College Graduates Serving as Village Officials Help Rural China?

被引:73
作者
He, Guojun [1 ,2 ]
Wang, Shaoda [3 ]
机构
[1] Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Div Social Sci, Div Environm & Sustainabil, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[2] Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Dept Econ, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[3] Univ Calif Berkeley, 241 Giannini Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
关键词
INCOME INEQUALITY; SOCIAL ASSISTANCE; POVERTY; GROWTH; DECENTRALIZATION; INSTITUTIONS; GOVERNANCE; LEADERS; ACCOUNTABILITY; INVESTMENT;
D O I
10.1257/app.20160079
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This study estimates the effect of improved bureaucrat quality on poverty alleviation by exploring a unique human capital reallocation policy in China-the College Graduate Village Officials (CGVOs) program. We find that introducing CGVOs into the village governance system improves the targeting and implementation of the central government's social assistance programs. CGVOs help eligible poor households understand and apply for relevant subsidies, thus increasing the number of pro-poor program beneficiaries. Further analysis suggests that CGVOs change bureaucrat quality, rather than quantity, of village governance, and their presence reduces elite capture of pro-poor programs.
引用
收藏
页码:186 / 215
页数:30
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