A behavioral model of clinician responses to incentives to improve quality

被引:76
作者
Frolich, Anne
Talavera, Jason A.
Broadhead, Peter
Dudley, R. Adams [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif San Francisco, Inst Hlth Policy Studies, San Francisco, CA 94143 USA
[2] Univ Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark
[3] Bispebjerg Hosp, DK-2400 Copenhagen, Denmark
[4] Univ Calif Davis, Sch Med, Davis, CA 95616 USA
基金
美国医疗保健研究与质量局;
关键词
incentive; financial; public reporting; pay for performance; quality; quality improvement; health care; reimbursement; PHYSICIAN FINANCIAL INCENTIVES; FEE-FOR-SERVICE; HEALTH-CARE; MANAGED CARE; IMMUNIZATION RATES; PREVENTIVE CARE; NATIONAL SURVEY; PERFORMANCE; REIMBURSEMENT; IMPACT;
D O I
10.1016/j.healthpol.2006.03.001
中图分类号
R19 [保健组织与事业(卫生事业管理)];
学科分类号
摘要
The use of pay for performance (P4P) and public reporting of performance (PR) in health care is increasing rapidly worldwide. The rationale for P4P and PR comes from experience in other industries and from theories about incentive use from psychology, economics, and organizational behavior. This paper reviews the major themes from this prior research and considers how they might be applied to health care. The resulting conceptual model addresses the dual nature (combining direct financial and reputational incentives) of the initiatives many policymakers are pursuing. It also includes explicit recognition of the key contextual factors (at the levels of the markets and the provider organization) and provider and patient characteristics that can enhance or mitigate response to incentives. Evaluation of the existing literature (through June 2005) about incentive use in health care in light of the conceptual model highlights important weaknesses in the way that trials have been reported to date and suggests future research topics. (c) 2006 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:179 / 193
页数:15
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