A trade-off result for preference revelation

被引：8

作者：

Campbell, DE ^{[1
]}

Kelly, JS

机构：

[1] Coll William & Mary, Dept Econ, Williamsburg, VA 23187 USA

[2] Coll William & Mary, Program Publ Policy, Williamsburg, VA 23187 USA

[3] Syracuse Univ, Dept Econ, Syracuse, NY 13245 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS | 2000年 / 34卷 / 01期

关键词：

trade-off; social choice; preference;

D O I：

10.1016/S0304-4068(99)00037-3

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

If the social choice rule g selects from one up to k alternatives (but not more), then there exists a coalition H of k individuals such that for each profile r, the choice set g(r) is the collection of the top-most alternatives in the orderings of the individuals in H. Consequently, g is independent of the preferences of individuals not in H, forcing a disagreeable trade-off: Either some choice sets are very large, or most individuals never have any say in the social choice. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：129 / 141

页数：13

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