Even more reasons to resist the temptation of power indices in the EU

被引：33

作者：

Garrett, G

Tsebelis, G

机构：

[1] Yale Univ, Dept Polit Sci, New Haven, CT 06520 USA

[2] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Dept Polit Sci, Los Angeles, CA 90024 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS | 2001年 / 13卷 / 01期

关键词：

game theory; power; power indices;

D O I：

10.1177/0951692801013001005

中图分类号：

D0 [政治学、政治理论];

学科分类号：

0302 ; 030201 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：99 / 105

页数：7

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