CEO After-Tax Compensation Incentives and Corporate Tax Avoidance

被引：140

作者：

Gaertner, Fabio B. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706 USA

来源：

CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH | 2014年 / 31卷 / 04期

关键词：

SENSITIVITY; PERFORMANCE; INCOME; SELECTION; PLANS; RISK; BIAS;

D O I：

10.1111/1911-3846.12058

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

I examine the association between CEOs' after-tax incentives and their firms' level of tax avoidance. Economic theory holds that firms should compensate CEOs on an after-tax basis when the expected tax savings generated from additional incentive alignment outweigh the incremental compensation demanded by CEOs for bearing additional tax-related compensation risk. Using hand-collected data from proxy statements, I find a negative relation between the use of after-tax incentives and effective tax rates. I also find a positive association between the use of after-tax incentives and CEO cash compensation, suggesting that CEOs who are compensated on an after-tax basis demand a premium for bearing additional risk.

引用

页码：1077 / 1102

页数：26

共 46 条

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