Efficiency in coalition games with externalities

被引：71

作者：

Hafalir, Isa E. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Penn State Univ, Dept Econ, University Pk, PA 16802 USA

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2007年 / 61卷 / 02期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

coalition formation; externalities; partition function games; Shapley value; implementation;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.009

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A natural extension of superadditivity is not sufficient to imply that the grand coalition is efficient when externalities are present. We provide a condition, analogous to convexity, that is sufficient for the grand coalition to be efficient and show that this also implies that the (appropriately defined) core is nonempty. Moreover, we propose a mechanism which implements the most efficient partition for all coalition formation games and characterizes the resulting payoff division. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：242 / 258

页数：17

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