Simultaneous auctions with synergies and common values

被引：43

作者：

Rosenthal, RW ^{[1
]}

Wang, RQ ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] QUEENS UNIV,DEPT ECON,KINGSTON,ON K7L 3N6,CANADA

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 1996年 / 17卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/game.1996.0093

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper, we study a simultaneous-auction model with synergies, common values, and overlapping interests. We construct strategies in which bidders of different types randomize over different bid intervals and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for such strategies to form symmetric equilibria. Questions about seller's revenue and efficiency are addressed. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.

引用

页码：32 / 55

页数：24

共 12 条

[1]

BRANCO F, 1996, UNPUB MULTIOBJECT AU

[2]

CRAMTON P, 1995, UNPUB PCS SPECTRUM A

[3] MONEY OUT OF THIN AIR - THE NATIONWIDE NARROW-BAND PCS AUCTION [J].