Crash Risk and the Auditor-Client Relationship

被引:124
作者
Callen, Jeffrey L. [1 ]
Fang, Xiaohua [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada
[2] Florida Atlantic Univ, Boca Raton, FL 33431 USA
关键词
crash risk; auditor-client relationship; agency conflicts; volatility smirk; INDUSTRY SPECIALIZATION; FIRM TENURE; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; CONDITIONAL SKEWNESS; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; LITIGATION RISK; PARTNER TENURE; JUMP-RISK; QUALITY; MARKET;
D O I
10.1111/1911-3846.12311
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This study examines whether the term of the auditor-client relationship (i.e., auditor tenure) is associated with future stock price crash risk measured both ex ante and ex post. Using a large sample of U.S. public firms with Big 4 auditors, we find robust evidence that auditor tenure is negatively related to one-year-ahead stock price crash risk. The evidence is consistent with monitoring-by-learning where development of client-specific knowledge over the term of the auditor-client relationship enhances auditors' ability to detect and deter bad news hoarding activities by clients, thereby reducing future crash risk. This result holds even after controlling for endogeneity of the tenure/crash risk relation. We further provide evidence indicating that option market investors do not fully incorporate the information contained in the term of auditor-client relationship in predicting future stock price crash risk. Our empirical results have important policy implications for regulators concerned with ensuring auditor independence.
引用
收藏
页码:1715 / 1750
页数:36
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