Liquidity and Shareholder Activism

被引：90

作者：

Norli, Oyvind ^{[1
]}

Ostergaard, Charlotte ^{[1
]}

Schindele, Ibolya ^{[1
,2
]}

机构：

[1] BI Norwegian Business Sch, N-0442 Oslo, Norway

[2] Cent Bank Hungary, Budapest, Hungary

来源：

REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES | 2015年 / 28卷 / 02期

关键词：

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; CROSS-SECTION; STOCK RETURNS; HEDGE FUNDS; COSTS; INVESTOR; IMPACT; SALES; RISK;

D O I：

10.1093/rfs/hhu070

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Blockholders' incentives to intervene in corporate governance are weakened by free-rider problems and high costs of activism. Theory suggests activists may recoup expenses through informed trading of target firms' stock when stocks are liquid. We show that stock liquidity increases the probability of activism but does less so for potentially overvalued firms for which privately informed blockholders may have greater incentives to sell their stake than to intervene. We also document that activists accumulate more stocks in targets when stock is more liquid. We conclude that liquidity helps overcome the free-rider problem and induces activism via preactivism accumulation of target firms' shares.

引用

页码：486 / 520

页数：35

共 45 条

[1] The "Wall Street Walk" and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice [J].