Interior matching equilibria in a public good economy: An aggregative game approach

被引：31

作者：

Buchholz, Wolfgang ^{[2
,3
]}

Cornes, Richard ^{[4
]}

Ruebbelke, Dirk ^{[1
,5
]}

机构：

[1] Basque Ctr Climate Change BC3, Bilbao 48008, Spain

[2] Univ Regensburg, D-93040 Regensburg, Germany

[3] CESifo Munich, Munich, Germany

[4] Australian Natl Univ, Res Sch Econ, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia

[5] Basque Fdn Sci, IKERBASQUE, Bilbao 48011, Spain

来源：

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS | 2011年 / 95卷 / 7-8期

关键词：

Aggregative games; Matching mechanisms; Public goods; Warr neutrality; EFFICIENT PRIVATE PROVISION; GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES; VOLUNTARY PROVISION; COLLECTIVE ACTION; AGENTS; MODEL;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.12.010

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

If the equilibrium generated by a matching mechanism is to be the desired Pareto optimal outcome, it is necessary for every player to be at an interior solution at that equilibrium. Using the aggregative game approach developed by Comes and Hartley (2003, 2007), this paper analyzes the conditions under which matching mechanisms in a public good economy lead to interior matching equilibria at which all agents make strictly positive flat contributions to the public good. In particular, we show that the distribution of income among the agents is crucial for both the existence of interior matching equilibria and Warr neutrality in the case of matching. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：639 / 645

页数：7

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