The dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science

被引：390

作者：

van Gelder, T ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Melbourne, Dept Philosophy, Parkville, Vic 3052, Australia

来源：

BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES | 1998年 / 21卷 / 05期

关键词：

cognition; computability; computational systems; computers; dynamical systems; modeling; systems; time;

D O I：

10.1017/S0140525X98001733

中图分类号：

B84 [心理学];

学科分类号：

04 ; 0402 ;

摘要：

According to the dominant computational approach in cognitive science, cognitive agents are digital computers; according to the alternative approach, they are dynamical systems. This target article attempts to articulate and support the dynamical hypothesis. The dynamical hypothesis has two major components: the nature hypothesis (cognitive agents are dynamical systems) and the knowledge hypothesis (cognitive agents can be understood dynamically). A wide range of objections to this hypothesis can be rebutted. The conclusion is that cognitive systems may well be dynamical systems, and only sustained empirical research in cognitive science will determine the extent to which that is true.

引用

页码：615 / +

页数：19