The World Trade Organization: Theory and Practice

被引:30
作者
Bagwell, Kyle [1 ]
Staiger, Robert W.
机构
[1] Stanford Univ, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
来源
ANNUAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS, VOL 2 | 2010年 / 2卷
关键词
WTO; GATT; trade agreements; terms-of-trade theory; DOMESTIC POLICIES; OPTIMAL TARIFFS; AGREEMENTS; LIBERALIZATION; RETALIATION; NEGOTIATIONS; ENFORCEMENT; GRADUALISM; PROTECTION; COUNTRIES;
D O I
10.1146/annurev.economics.102308.124500
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We consider the purpose and design of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and review recent developments in the relevant theoretical and empirical literature. We describe the GATT/WTO architecture and briefly trace its historical antecedents. We suggest that the existing literature provides a useful framework for understanding and interpreting central features of the design and practice of the GATT/WTO, and we identify key unresolved issues.
引用
收藏
页码:223 / 256
页数:34
相关论文
共 137 条
[1]   The US Trade Deficit, the Decline of the WTO and the Rise of Regionalism [J].
Agur, Itai .
GLOBAL ECONOMY JOURNAL, 2008, 8 (03)
[2]  
Anderson J.E., 2002, BROOKINGS TRADE FORU, P207
[3]  
[Anonymous], 2000, Improving WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures
[4]  
[Anonymous], WTO GOVERNANCE DISPU
[5]  
ANTRAS P, 2008, 14285 NBER
[6]   Multilateral trade negotiations, bilateral opportunism and the rules of GATT/WTO [J].
Bagwell, K ;
Staiger, RW .
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 2005, 67 (02) :268-294
[7]   An economic theory of GATT [J].
Bagwell, K ;
Staiger, RW .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1999, 89 (01) :215-248
[8]  
BAGWELL K, 1990, AM ECON REV, V80, P779
[9]   Enforcement, private political pressure, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization escape clause [J].
Bagwell, K ;
Staiger, RW .
JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, 2005, 34 (02) :471-513
[10]   It's a question of market access [J].
Bagwell, K ;
Mavroidis, PC ;
Staiger, RW .
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2002, 96 (01) :56-76