Voluntary contributions to a joint project with asymmetric agents

被引：21

作者：

Compte, O

Jehiel, P

机构：

[1] ENPC, CERAS, F-75014 Paris, France

[2] UCL, London WC1E 6BT, England

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2003年 / 112卷 / 02期

关键词：

voluntary contributions; sunk contributions; asymmetry; gradualism;

D O I：

10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00103-0

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We revisit Admati and Perry (1991)'s model of voluntary contributions to a joint project. Their main result that equilibrium contributions are small appears not to be robust to the introduction of asymmetries. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.

引用

页码：334 / 342

页数：9

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