A bilevel model of taxation and its application to optimal highway pricing

被引：228

作者：

Labbé, M

Marcotte, P

Savard, G

机构：

[1] Free Univ Brussels, Inst Stat & Rech Operat, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium

[2] Univ Montreal, Ctr Rech Transports, Montreal, PQ H3C 3J7, Canada

[3] Univ Montreal, Dept Informat & Rech Operat, Montreal, PQ H3C 3J7, Canada

[4] Ecole Polytech, Gerad, Montreal, PQ H3C 3A7, Canada

[5] Ecole Polytech, Dept Math & Genie Ind, Montreal, PQ H3C 3A7, Canada

来源：

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE | 1998年 / 44卷 / 12期

关键词：

pricing; networks; bilevel;

D O I：

10.1287/mnsc.44.12.1608

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

We consider a bilevel model where the leader wants to maximize revenues from a taxation scheme, while the follower rationally reacts to those tax levels. We focus our attention on the special case of a toll-setting problem defined on a multicommodity transportation network. We show that the general problem is NP-complete, while particular instances are polynomially solvable. Numerical examples are given.

引用

页码：1608 / 1622

页数：15

共 23 条

[1] A SOLUTION METHOD FOR THE STATIC CONSTRAINED STACKELBERG PROBLEM VIA PENALTY METHOD [J].